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Same-Sex Marriage on the Iberian 
Peninsula: The Church and Franco’s 
Competing Legacies
Noah Jennings
In recent years, the legal recognition of marriage between same-sex partners has turned 
into a hot-button political topic the world over. From California and Mexico City to South 
Africa and Argentina, same-sex marriage1 has been the subject of contention in courts, legis-
latures, and referendums. The political and social debates surrounding these unions date as far 
back to the 1980s, when Denmark became the first country in the world to legalize a form 
of registered partnerships for same-sex couples. In the subsequent decades, other jurisdic-
tions, primarily in Europe and North America, followed suit and legalized similar partner-
ships that gave LGBT2 couples rights and responsibilities similar to marriage.  
It wasn’t until 2001, when the Netherlands became the first country in the world to 
adopt gender-neutral marriage that marriage became a legal possibility for LGBT couples. 
The Dutch government’s decision generated little controversy in that nation’s socially liberal 
society, but soon spurred discussion and movements for gender-neutral marriage in other 
countries. Now that same-sex marriage was actually happening, progressives and LGBT 
rights organizations began advocating for gender-neutral marriage the world over. Two years 
later, neighboring Belgium followed suit by legalizing same-sex marriage. Within several 
more years and through a combination of legislation and judicial decisions, Massachusetts, 
Canada, Spain, and South Africa would all open up marriage to same-sex couples, suggest-
ing that the LGBT rights campaign for relationship recognition had turned into a global 
movement. Today, same-sex marriages are performed nationwide in ten countries and four 
continents. Europe is likely the most LGBT-friendly region; seven of the ten countries that 
perform same-sex marriage are located there. Furthermore, a majority of member-states in 
the European Union recognize or allow at least some form of same-sex union, ranging from 
1 Same-sex marriage and gender-neutral marriage are terms that will be used synonymously when referring to 
a legal marriage between two persons of the same sex, colloquially known as gay marriage. Same-sex union is a 
broader term for legal statuses between two persons of the same sex including marriage, domestic partnerships, and 
civil unions.
2 When referring to the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer community, I will be using the term LGBT.
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full marriage rights in Sweden (including a church wedding) to registered partnerships in 
Austria and Germany. A Eurobarometer poll released by the European Commission in 2006 
shows substantial support for same-sex marriage in major countries like the United King-
dom, France, and Germany.
Popular support for same-sex marriage
However, European attitudes regarding same-sex marriage and other partnerships are 
hardly universal. While the same Eurobarometer poll indicates public support for same-sex 
marriage is at 82 and 71 percent in the Netherlands and Sweden respectively, support is 
much lower at only 15 percent in Greece and Bulgaria. Looking at the report, we can make 
some general observations and assumptions based on their findings. Support for same-sex 
marriage is much higher amongst countries in Western Europe, while support is almost 
universally low in the Eastern European countries that comprised the Soviet Bloc, with a 
notable exception of the Czech Republic, which actually has majority support. Majority 
support can also be found in Germany, Belgium, Sweden, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Denmark, and Spain; four of these countries currently have gender-neutral marriage3. 
Stances on same-sex marriage are equally varied among political parties, ranging from 
near universal support to total condemnation. In some areas of Europe, particularly in Scan-
dinavia and the Low Countries, same-sex marriage is widely supported across the political 
spectrum. In Sweden for instance, only one minor political party in the parliament adopted a 
position against the center-right government’s legislation to allow same-sex marriage. Simi-
larly, in Iceland no single member of the parliament voted against that country’s measure 
to legalize gender-neutral marriage. In these countries, LGBT rights are considered under 
human rights, a key value of many modern liberal democracies. In contrast, governments in 
Poland, Slovakia, and many other Eastern European countries remain vocally homophobic; 
opposing not only same-sex unions but also actively discriminating against and demonizing 
their country’s LGBT minorities. While advocates see gender-neutral marriage to be the 
next step in the continuing human rights movement, opponents see it as an erosion of reli-
gious and traditional values.
Religion and same-sex marriage
Some of the most prominent and oft cited opponents of same-sex marriage and LGBT 
rights have been religious organizations. This is certainly descriptive of the dynamic in the 
United States, where campaigns against same-sex marriage—most notably in California’s 
battle over Proposition 8—were heavily supported by Catholic, Mormon, and Evangelical 
churches.   Religious opposition to same-sex marriage in Europe is also well documented. 
In a strongly Catholic country like Italy, where the Catholic Church defines the debate on 
LGBT rights, support for same-sex marriage was polled at only 31 percent. In addition to 
the Eurobarometer poll on same-sex marriage, I studied a Eurobarometer poll on religious 
attitudes. In order to investigate religiosity’s relationship with support for same-sex marriage, 
I plotted the results of the Eurobarometer polls on same-sex marriage and religiosity4.  In 
many cases, such as in Malta and Poland, low support for same-sex marriage corresponds 
with higher levels of religiosity, while in Sweden and Denmark, high support for same-sex 
3 A chart from the Eurobarometer report detailing the above information is included in the appendices.
4 Both the Eurobarometer poll on religious beliefs and my own analysis of the two polls are included in the ap-
pendices.
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marriage comes with lower religiosity.
However, the Eurobarometer polls give us counter examples of religious countries with 
strong support for same-sex marriage. Spain and Portugal are both clear contradictions to 
the conventional notion that religion is the sole cause of opposition to same-sex marriage. 
According to the Eurobarometer polls, Spain has majorities that both accept same-sex mar-
riage and believe in god, meaning that Spain is above the EU average in both support for 
LGBT rights and religiosity. Portugal is also of note in this case because although a low level 
of support for same-sex marriage corresponds to the country’s higher religiosity, Portugal is 
one of the few European countries to have actually taken the step to legalize same-sex mar-
riage. So, despite being overwhelmingly Catholic and having lukewarm popular support for 
LGBT rights, Portugal’s government is at the world’s forefront in relationship recognition 
laws for same-sex couples.  
Analysis of Eurobarometer polls on religiosity and support for same-sex mar-
riage, first throughout Europe and then exclusively in countries with same-sex 
marriage laws
37
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While the conventional wisdom would suggest that a highly religious country would 
be opposed to same-sex unions, as is the case in Italy, I was curious as to why Catholic 
countries such as Spain and Portugal would go against Vatican doctrine and embrace same-
sex marriage.  Despite being overwhelmingly Catholic, the Spanish government legalized 
gender-neutral marriage in 2005 and polls consistently show majority support for same-sex 
marriage. Because Catholicism is so prevalent in the country, and homosexuality is consid-
ered at odds with official Church doctrine, there must be some other factors that influenced 
Spain in this decision that cannot be simply defined in terms of religion. Consequently, my 
research consisted of a historical analysis of Spain’s circumstances surrounding same-sex mar-
riage, considering the country’s recent history and experiences transitioning from fascism to 
a liberal democracy. I found there were several factors other than religion stemming from 
Spain’s experience under Francisco Franco’s forty-year reign as dictator that help to explain 
why the Spanish people were so receptive to the new understanding of LGBT rights as a 
human rights issue. I continued my analysis in neighboring Portugal, a country with a simi-
lar experience as Spain where the same factors also help to explain that country’s dramatic 
transformation concerning LGBT rights. Together, these two countries serve as examples 
demonstrating how a prolonged history of right-wing oppression followed by sudden de-
mocratization can result in Catholic societies that respect an LGBT inclusive definition of 
human rights.
Having identified these common factors, perhaps we can recognize some wider im-
plications about how framing LGBT rights from a “Spanish” perspective could change the 
debate here in the United States. It helps us better to define the LGBT rights movement 
not as a struggle against organized religion as it is so often framed, but instead a movement 
for equality and human rights. In order to accept LGBT people, their rights, and same-sex 
marriage, it was not necessary for Spaniards to reject their religious beliefs and values. The 
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Catholic Church is still an integral part of the culture, spirituality, and daily lives of many 
Spaniards. Despite Church teaching that condemns “homosexual lifestyles” and same-sex 
relationships, the Spanish society was able to cast off these oppressive notions and open the 
door for an accurate understanding of LGBT rights as an extension of human rights. I will 
argue that this newfound perspective for millions of Spanish women and men occurred 
because of their own marginalization and oppression endured under the fascist experience.  
Furthermore, LGBT rights activists could use this experience as an example. Advocates 
should not position themselves as the antithesis to religiosity. While religious organizations 
like the Catholic Church are rightfully criticized for their drastic activism against LGBT 
rights and same-sex unions, LGBT rights activists should take note of Spain and see that 
religion, even Catholicism, and support for same-sex marriage are not mutually exclusive. 
In this question, an individual’s ability to relate to the experiences of the marginalized and 
oppressed is more important than espousing or denying the religious dogma. By looking 
at the examples of Spain and Portugal, where LGBT rights were successfully reframed as a 
human rights issue instead of a matter of morality or religion, US LGBT rights organiza-
tions could learn valuable lessons about how to continue the struggle for same-sex marriage 
in the United States. Following ballot defeats in California and Maine, where groups like 
the National Organization for Marriage successfully framed the campaign in a moral and 
religious context, advocates for LGBT rights need to look upon the successes in Spain and 
Portugal and work to reframe the argument over same-sex marriage as part of the struggle 
for civil rights. Based on these observations, working to establish the discourse over same-
sex marriage as a human rights issue is the best hope LGBT rights advocates have to achieve 
gender-neutral marriage in the United States.
Catholic Church’s stance on same-sex marriage
As was the case with Proposition 8, the Catholic Church has been unwaveringly op-
posed to any government’s attempt to recognize same-sex relationships under the law. The 
Church outlines and reasons its opposition to same-sex unions in a document released by the 
Vatican in 2003 by then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger and current Pope Benedict XVI. Because 
homosexual relationships are against the natural moral law, Ratzinger wrote that, “Legal rec-
ognition of homosexual unions or placing them on the same level as marriage would mean 
not only the approval of deviant behaviour, with the consequence of making it a model in 
present-day society, but would also obscure basic values which belong to the common inher-
itance of humanity” (Ratzinger, 2003). The Catholic Church argues that endorsing same-sex 
unions would tarnish institutions like the family and jeopardize the stability of our society. 
This rigid stance puts even the policies of domestic partnerships and civil unions, which are 
nearly universally adopted in Western European countries, in contradiction with the official 
Church teaching on homosexual relationships and same-sex unions.
Ratzinger also has a message on morality directed to those in public office facing votes 
regarding same-sex unions, providing specific guidelines for Catholic politicians consider-
ing such legislation. Ratzinger states that, “When legislation in favour of the recognition of 
homosexual unions is proposed for the first time in a legislative assembly, the Catholic law-
maker has a moral duty to express his opposition clearly and publicly and to vote against it” 
(Ratzinger, 2003). It would seem that Catholic politicians in Ireland, France, and Germany 
are already in discord with the Church for allowing same-sex unions other than full-fledged 
marriage. Still, the Vatican was successful in killing support for legislation to allow same-sex 
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civil unions in Italy. While domestic partnerships and other same-sex unions separate from 
marriage are still considered unacceptable, the Vatican particularly objects to same-sex mar-
riage because of marriage’s importance as a sacrament within the Church. As a result, the 
most high profile campaigns waged by the Catholic Church against same-sex unions have 
been against laws that provided gender-neutral marriage.  
Catholic Church’s reactions to same-sex unions in Italy
There is perhaps no better country in which to examine the Church’s influence over 
whether or not to adopt same-sex unions than Italy. The country’s historical, cultural, and 
geographical proximity to the Vatican mean that the Catholic Church is an integral part of 
Italian daily life. We can begin by examining some of the political factors that have influenced 
the Italian government’s standoffish approach to same-sex unions. One important charac-
teristic would be the centralized nature of the national government. In policies relating to 
‘family matters,’ only the national parliament has the authority to make legislation (Moscati, 
2010). Local jurisdictions and municipalities lack any real power to enact same-sex marriage 
or significant domestic partnerships in their respective regions. While some Italian localities, 
such as Pisa and Bologna, have passed measures to provide for same-sex partnerships, the re-
ality is that they are almost entirely symbolic and afford few civil rights to same-sex couples. 
Same-sex partnerships formed in these cities receive no recognition in neighboring parts 
of the country (Merin, 2002). Because of the highly centralized Italian state, sub-national 
legislation on same-sex partnerships has next to no effect on the national political discourse. 
In fact, even the very limited actions taken by local authorities to create some sort of legal 
framework for same-sex couples have come under fire in the Italian courts as an overreach 
past the federalist limitations (Moscati, 2010). The centralized Italian system means that any 
meaningful discourse on same-sex unions must come from the national government.
We can also look at the LGBT rights policies of Italy’s main political parties to ex-
plain the country’s failure to enact legislation on same-sex unions. In Italy and throughout 
Western Europe, most political opposition to LGBT rights comes from the right-wing and 
conservative parties. The current administration of Silvio Berlusconi, three time prime min-
ister and leader of center-right politics in Italy, is completely opposed to same-sex unions. 
However, a brief window of opportunity opened for LGBT activists in Italy when the 
center-left coalition led by Romano Prodi won elections and formed a government in 
2006 (Moscati, 2010). In anticipation, many assumed that as a center-left party, the Prodi 
administration would advance legislation furthering same-sex unions. Accordingly, Prodi’s 
government announced that it would begin the dialogue and introduce legislation providing 
for a form of domestic partnership. However, unlike in many European countries, support 
for LGBT rights was not universal amongst the left-wing members of the governing coali-
tion (Fabrizio, 2007). Even radically left-wing organizations such as the Italian Communist 
Party found themselves in opposition to the expansion of LGBT rights. Instead of reaching 
a consensus on this issue, the left-wing members of the coalition government fragmented, 
and the chance to enact legislation on same-sex unions ended when the Prodi parliament 
fell from power in 2008. The return of a right-wing government again under the leadership 
of Berlusconi meant that a bill on same-sex partnerships in Italy would not be a possibility 
in the foreseeable future (Moscati, 2010).
One could argue that perhaps the most obvious factor influencing Italy’s rejection 
of same-sex unions is the role of the Catholic Church. Not only is Italy a predominately 
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Catholic country, but it is also a society where the church exudes significant authority over 
politics (Fabrizio, 2007). One very simple reason that the Catholic Church is so dominant 
here is the geographical proximity; the Vatican is only a short few miles away from the na-
tional government’s parliament in Rome. The Pope’s historical and permanent presence in 
the Italian capital makes him into a political institution in his own right. After all, the Catho-
lic Church has been headquartered in Rome centuries longer than there has been an Italian 
nation-state. As such, there is perhaps nowhere in the world where the church’s influence 
and judgments are more powerful. It is also worth noting that the power of the Vatican over 
Italian politics is not rooted in only one party or one side of the political spectrum. Instead, 
Catholicism is of incredible importance to right-wing and left-wing political parties across 
the board. The Vatican’s fierce condemnation of homosexuality and the so-called “erosion” 
of traditional family values strongly resonated with representatives from every political party 
in parliament (Moscati, 2010). This is likely the most important thing to consider in the 
Italian political system when debating why the left-wing government under Prodi failed 
to unite behind legislation on same-sex union. The Catholic Church successfully defined 
the political debate from its standpoint of moral condemnation. As an influential moral and 
political authority, the Vatican asserted itself over the proposals of the left-wing government 
and ultimately won the debate.
Italy must also cope with the codified interference of the Catholic Church in the 
state’s affairs. While the Vatican may be a country independent of Italy, the opposite is not 
quite true. In fact, the Vatican still enjoys certain rights to intervene in Italian politics that 
were adopted in the Lateran Treaties, dating back to 1929 (Fabrizio, 2007). Signed by the 
Catholic Church and the fascist government of Benito Mussolini, the Lateran Treaties guar-
anteed the Vatican political independence in exchange for the stability and control provided 
by a unifying state religion. So, as long as the Vatican worked to maintain the status quo of 
dictatorship in Italy, the Church would have the exclusive rights over the people’s religion. 
While the government of Italy has since changed to a democracy, its relationship with the 
Vatican remains much the same.5 Despite repealing fragments of the Lateran Treaties in the 
1980s, many portions of the treaty still stand (Moscati, 2010). This right to freely involve itself 
in Italian politics came to be used when the Prodi government was debating same-sex civil 
unions. On June 26, 2006, the Pontifical Council released a document strongly condemning 
any legislation contrary to the “traditional family” and in favor of same-sex couples. The Vati-
can asserted that efforts to redefine this age old tradition with a radical new phenomenon of 
homosexuality would be a direct attack at the very foundations of society, similar to Ratz-
inger’s 2003 statements on homosexual relationships. (Fabrizio, 2007). With this powerful 
deviation into Italian politics, legislation on same-sex unions stood little chance of moving 
through Parliament.
Another facet of Italian history that is relevant in this debate is that the country lacked 
any LGBT movements until very recently. While LGBT rights organizations formed in 
many of the world’s other western democracies in the 1970s and 1980s, sparking social and 
political discourse on the controversial issues of homosexuality and same-sex unions, the is-
sue remained out of the Italian public sphere until much later. Indeed, it seemed that LGBT 
Italians had little to fight for. Homosexuality had been decriminalized in Italy since the brief 
adoption of the Napoleonic Code by the 19th century, meaning that a campaign for decrim-
5 For instance, the Catholic Church lobbied strongly against the liberalization of divorce, stopping legislation to 
reform divorce laws until 1974.
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inalization was unnecessary (Moscati, 2010). With the Catholic Church firmly entrenched 
against any form of same-sex union that would “jeopardize the sanctity of marriage,” efforts 
towards relationship recognition was simply too far out of reach. Lacking the prior establish-
ment of LGBT rights organizations, the battle for same-sex unions was never mainstreamed, 
leaving the heterosexist societal norms unchallenged and the general populace unexposed. 
Modern day Italian LGBT rights activists lack the groundwork laid in other countries with 
longer records of LGBT activism and more expansive rights for same-sex couples. Instead, 
Italian society seems to ignore the whole issue of homosexuality, shoving it “out of sight, out 
of mind” instead of conducting a public discourse on the topic.  
These implications are only now beginning to change with a more vocal LGBT rights 
organizations and a more prominent LGBT community. Despite this recent activism, it is 
important to realize that the current inequities in relationship recognition stem from the 
historical silence of the Italian LGBT community in politics (Moscati, 2010). Italy is an ex-
ample of a country where the only discernable voice in the same-sex union debate was the 
Catholic Church. While a successful LGBT rights movement would have sought to define 
same-sex unions as a human rights issue, the Catholic Church’s overwhelming dominance 
over the Italians’ political and social lives meant the Vatican could successfully frame the 
discourse in its own terms as a religious and moral issue, giving the Church undeniable 
authority. With almost no LGBT rights organizations or strong advocates to oppose them 
in making the human rights argument, the Catholic Church’s strong messages condemning 
the proposed legislation were heard loud and clear by Italy’s Catholic politicians, dooming 
same-sex unions in that country.
THE SPANISH CASE STUDY
Events leading to same-sex marriage in Spain
In Spain, the political factors that affected the country’s legalization of same-sex mar-
riage were much more complex to be defined simply by the country’s Catholic beliefs, 
ultimately contributing to a more conducive environment for LGBT rights organizations 
to succeed in defining the debate as a human rights issue and in achieving gender-neutral 
marriage. Spain is composed of many jurisdictions that enjoy significant political autonomy 
from the central Spanish government. The right to self-governance in regions such as Cata-
lonia and Andalusia is a strong component of the country’s federalist system. Prior to Spain’s 
nationwide adoption of same-sex marriage, same-sex unions were already present in many 
of the local communities (Moscati, 2010). In fact, the earliest same-sex partnership law was 
enacted in Catalonia in 1998. Another region, Aragon, authorized a virtually identical part-
nership law the very next year. By the time same-sex marriage was legalized throughout 
Spain in 2005, 12 out of the 17 regions had registries recognizing some sort of same-sex 
union. In addition to these regions, a multitude of smaller localities and cities instituted their 
own forms of same-sex unions (Méndez, 2007). In retrospect, these early partnership laws in 
the sub-national Spanish communities blazed the trail for countrywide recognition. Without 
the sovereignty specifically vested in the Spanish federalist system, same-sex marriage would 
have faced more difficulties gaining support at a national level (Moscati, 2010).
The political persuasions of the main Spanish political parties offer more details as 
to why the country chose to legalize same-sex marriage. Hostility towards LGBT rights 
and same-sex partnerships is firmly cemented in Spain’s right-wing political parties. How-
ever, the left-wing Spanish politicians are staunch supporters of same-sex unions and even 
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gender-neutral marriage (Moscati, 2010). In fact, same-sex marriage became a possibility 
in Spain after the 2004 elections that swept the Spanish Socialist Party into power. Socialist 
leader Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, who would become prime minister after his victory 
in the polls, pledged to legalize same-sex marriage as one of his party’s platforms. Zapatero 
would make good on that promise less than a year later when the Socialist dominated parlia-
ment passed a bill allowing for gender-neutral marriage throughout Spain (Petrou, 2006). 
Same-sex unions in Spain had very strong support from the left-wing political parties and 
their elected representatives. Lawmakers on the left considered extending marriage to same-
sex couples to be necessary in order to guarantee equal access to basic human rights. The 
moral authority of the Catholic Church and their official teachings on homosexuality took 
a back seat to concerns about equality.
Even though Spain is historically and demographically an overwhelmingly Catholic 
country when considering the percentage of people who identify as Catholic, religious 
involvement is an important characteristic to consider. When we actually look at those who 
are actively practicing, the rate plummets to a mere 20 percent (Petrou, 2006). Therefore, the 
Catholic Church is not necessarily the most important influence in the daily lives of most 
Spanish Catholics, as it may have been in the past. In politics, the Catholic Church plays a 
very important role in the right-wing political parties that stand for the “traditional fam-
ily,” social conservatism, and more religious involvement in everyday life. On the other side 
of the political spectrum, the Catholic Church finds wavering support on the left-wing of 
Spanish politics (Moscati, 2010). Perhaps the most poignant example of the left’s dismissal of 
the church can be seen in the relations between the two states’ leaders. When Pope Benedict 
XVI traveled to Valencia in 2006 to attend a conference on the family, millions of Spaniards 
flocked to the city for the chance to see him criticize secularization and the abandonment of 
traditional values. Not among the crowds was Socialist Prime Minister Zapatero who, hav-
ing defied Papal authority the year before by advocating for the Spanish same-sex marriage 
law, chose not to attend the Pope’s mass, causing somewhat of a public scandal in both Spain 
and Italy (Petrou, 2006). This chilly reception serves as a vivid illustration of demarcation 
between the Catholic Church and the secular left-wing political parties of Spain.
Reasons behind Spain’s acceptance of same-sex marriage
The next part of my research seeks to examine popular Spanish support for same-sex 
marriage by reviewing various sources on Spain’s past to see what could be the motives for 
such liberal laws regarding LGBT rights, in spite of the country’s Catholic roots. One possi-
ble cause for the drastic differences could be found in the historical analysis of Spain’s history 
stemming back to the oppressive 20th century dictatorship of Francisco Franco. Looking at 
Spain’s experiences with changing personal freedoms, gender roles, and Europeanization, we 
might be able to see a different picture of this issue dominated less by religion and more by 
the country’s individual understanding of authoritarianism and reform. Instead of a nation 
dominated by Catholic doctrine, we would see that the cultural and political acceptance of 
LGBT people, rights, and same-sex unions is much more complex and dependent on expe-
riences specific to Spain and the oppression under the fascist dictatorship.
Reactions to the concept of personal freedom are important to consider, as the right to 
same-sex marriage is most accurately framed as a discussion of this issue. Spain has had a very 
different experience than many other European countries during the latter half of the 20th 
century concerning civil rights and liberties. Instead of a democratically elected government, 
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as was the case in almost all Western European nations, Spain endured the fascist regime of 
Francisco Franco. After 1939, when homosexuality was criminalized under Franco’s rule, the 
regime actively persecuted LGBT Spaniards. Homosexuality seemed to run contrary to the 
traditional gender norms assumed in a fascist society. Men were to be dominant and full of 
machismo, while women were expected to be submissive instruments of domesticity. Public 
schools in Spain were segregated according to sex, with girls and boys receiving separate 
curriculums. While males were given a traditional comprehensive education, females were 
only instructed in domestic duties such as sewing and other non-academic subjects. The in-
stitution of these “natural” gender roles in Spain found homosexuality as a challenge to these 
enforced stereotypes, making same-sex relationships an unstable and potentially destructive 
element of society (Martinez & Dodge, 2010).
As a parallel, Franco installed Catholicism as the primary source of moral authority in 
his state. As the official state religion, the Church was awarded a tax-free status and was the 
recipient of government subsidies. The Catholic Church was forcefully incorporated into 
the daily lives of all Spanish citizens. Under Franco marriages were only valid if properly 
conducted through the Catholic Church, a far cry from the gender-neutral marriages in 
modern Spain. The fascist government sometimes went so far as to require couples married 
before the dictatorship to remarry in the Church, so as to guarantee that they had a Catholic 
wedding. As the official state religious doctrine, the Catholic Church had a monopoly on 
matters of morality. As such, homosexuality was universally framed by both the Church and 
the fascist government as unnatural, immoral, and incompatible with their ideal societies in 
which men were superior, masculine, and very Catholic (Martinez & Dodge, 2010).
In Franco’s authoritarian Spain, homophobia was institutionalized along with sexism 
and Catholicism, meaning LGBT people were to be exiled to the extreme margins of society. 
Franco’s administration even set up a special system of punishment to deal with the “crimi-
nal” LGBT population. Men found guilty of homosexual acts were sent to prisons specifi-
cally organized to house LGBT people. Known as gallerias de invertidos, or “deviant galleries,” 
these prisons sought to both punish and correct homosexual behavior amongst the incar-
cerated. Once imprisoned, LGBT captives were subject to hard labor, beatings, torture, and 
psychological “treatments,” including electroshock therapy. Over the course of Franco’s rule, 
over 5,000 men were sent to such deviant galleries, while countless others faced widespread 
persecution outside the walls of the prisons (Martinez & Dodge, 2010). Of course, oppres-
sion in Franco’s Spain was not limited to LGBT people. Spaniards of all sexual orientations 
had their freedoms violated and life under the dictatorship was difficult for many. 
The fascist nature of the Franco dictatorship bred discontent out of oppression, spark-
ing a multitude of counter movements in favor of greater civil liberties. Eventually, Franco’s 
death in 1975 would lead to a popular transition from authoritarianism and conservatism to 
democratization and liberalism. One of the groups that grew extensively during this demo-
cratic transformation in Spain was the LGBT rights movement. However, one could argue 
that the LGBT groups gained widespread momentum in the transitional decades between 
Franco and democracy because of the evolving perceptions of gender roles. While fascist 
Spain had confined women to the homes and marginalized them in public life, the new 
Spanish society sought to incorporate women equally into all aspects of society. Gender 
roles were to be redefined, which opened space for other groups marginalized by sexism, 
misogyny, and machismo (Platero, 2007). Therefore, Spaniards who had previously viewed 
homosexuality in a traditional, negative light, as illuminated by the Catholic Church and fas-
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cism were willing to look on LGBT people with openness. With a newfound emphasis on 
equality, LGBT rights groups were in the perfect environment to flourish.
At the same time, assumptions regarding the Catholic Church as the ultimate authority 
were being challenged, especially on matters concerning human rights. While the Catholic 
Church had benefitted enormously in Spain under Franco’s rule, the Church had done little 
to stand against the systemic oppression endured by millions of Spanish citizens. The Spanish 
people remembered the Church’s implicit endorsement of fascism and Catholicism became 
associated with the historical tyranny experienced under Franco. From this experience, the 
Church’s authority on morality would no longer be allowed to subvert the values of equality 
and human rights. This new perspective framed the discussion of LGBT rights in an entirely 
new way. Instead of a battle over morality in a predominately Catholic society (a battle the 
Church would almost invariably win), the debate was about human rights. In the eyes, of 
Spaniards, the Catholic Church had little authority to speak in regards to human rights after 
supporting a totalitarian dictatorship for nearly half a century.
Even with the country’s newfound freedom, change did not occur overnight. One of 
the first issues that Spanish LGBT rights groups addressed was the criminal status of homo-
sexuality. After forty years of state persecution, laws criminalizing homosexuality in Spain 
were finally repealed in 1979. Bolstered by the success of this campaign, LGBT rights organi-
zations went on to achieve anti-discrimination legislation in employment, government, and 
housing. By the 1990s, the battle had shifted to working towards relationship recognition in 
the autonomous communities. Many observers saw the realization of gender-neutral mar-
riage in 2005 as the final step in the march towards equal rights for LGBT people (Méndez, 
2007). However, without this long history and progression of goals, the national campaign 
to legalization same-sex marriage would have had no support to base itself on. In a way, the 
LGBT community can owe their present day successes and victories in relationship recogni-
tion to counter-reactions against the tyranny of Franco’s regime.
In addition to being a reactionary step against fascism and outdated gender roles, 
Spain’s adoption of same-sex marriage could be viewed in the context of Europeanization 
and modernization of the country. Unlike many of its Western European companions, Spain 
was not a founding member of the European Coal and Steel Community (the precursor 
organization to the EU) or even NATO. Membership was not achieved in either organiza-
tion until 1986 and 1982 respectively. When Spain did join the European Community, it was 
regarded with some skepticism and disdain because of its recent authoritarian government 
and lower economic standards of living. Along with Portugal, Greece, and Ireland, Spain was 
disparagingly labeled among the “Poor Four” members of the EU. Many considered Spanish 
membership in the EC to be disadvantageous to the developed nations of Europe, as some 
thought that the relatively underdeveloped and fragile Spain would jeopardize economic 
stability. In a sense, Spain had a lot to prove to the other countries of Western Europe in order 
to gain respect, prestige, and equal footing in Europe. Spain sought this transformation into 
a new and modern country not only through economic means, but also social and human 
rights reforms. While Spain under Franco had been among the most oppressed societies in 
Western Europe, Spanish politicians wanted reform in order to give the country a better 
reputation.  
Steps towards liberalizing LGBT rights can be seen in a similar light. A new, open, and 
democratic Spain needed to redefine itself as a nation at the forefront of modernity and 
liberalism, as is expected amongst Western countries. Adopting same-sex marriage was a 
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good chance to make Spain stand out as only the third country in the world to open up the 
possibility of gender-neutral marriage, making it look especially modern in comparison to 
its Western European neighbors. A parallel example is occurring in Eastern Europe, where 
former communist countries are vying for the benefits of membership in the EU. Despite 
widespread public hostility towards LGBT people, countries including Serbia, Poland, and 
Romania all have laws protecting LGBT people from discrimination in the workplace, hous-
ing, and other areas. In practice, these laws are often abused and unenforced, but in principle 
they are required as human rights standards before the EU will even consider admitting a 
new nation into their modern and democratic society. While in Spain EU membership was 
not a concern at the exact time when politicians were debating the country’s gender-neutral 
marriage laws, the idea and policy is still comparable (Merin, 2002).
Poland as an authoritarian counterexample
When looking at these three characteristics of Spain and using them to explain why 
same-sex marriage was so accepted by modern Spanish society, I must be the first to admit 
that there are some quite obvious examples of European countries that suffered through 
the second half of the 20th century under authoritarian regimes and that have emerged as 
homophobic and very much against LGBT rights and same-sex unions. Poland, for instance, 
was liberated after World War II only to be subjected to a communist puppet government 
under Moscow’s hegemonic rule over the whole of the Warsaw Pact. Why did not Poland, 
which also happens to be a heavily Catholic country, experience a remarkable shift in un-
derstanding as soon as the Iron Curtain fell and Eastern Europe began democratizing? Quite 
frankly, it is difficult to say why attitudes in Eastern Europe regarding sexuality and LGBT 
rights are so different than in Western Europe. However, I can make several observations and 
distinctions on how the experiences I described in Spain relate to Poland and help us better 
understand why that country remains so hostile to LGBT rights, despite having experienced 
an oppressive and totalitarian regime.  
First of all, I think there is an important distinction in the idealism of the authoritarian 
regimes that ruled Poland and Spain. While Poland was certainly not a democratic state, it 
was socialist and not fascist. The socialist states of Eastern Europe were by no means without 
sexism, but they were not as virulently sexist as the machismo idealism of fascism. While 
Franco’s government sought to silence and contain women in the home to be domestic 
and maternal slaves, the socialist regimes in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany put 
women to work, provided universal childcare, and involved them in the Communist Party’s 
politics. So, when democratization did happen in Poland, their society did not see such a 
radical redefinition and rebellion against the oppressive gender roles as was witnessed in 
Spain because Polish women were not being subjugated to those narrow gender roles in the 
first place. Gender roles in Poland were left unchallenged, leaving LGBT people with no 
opportunity to capitalize on this new favorable movement for equality.
Poland is also very different than Spain when we consider the role of religion and 
how it influenced the debate over LGBT rights. Even though both countries are strongly 
historically Catholic, an important distinction can be made in how their respective gov-
ernment’s viewed the Church. As discussed, the role of the Catholic Church in Spain was 
institutionalized along with the state’s fascist doctrines. The socialist regimes in Poland on 
the other hand were not Catholic in nature, and often found themselves at odds with the 
Vatican, especially during the papacy of Pope John Paul II, who happened to hail from Po-
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land. In this country, the Catholic Church escaped association with the oppressive regimes 
and since the Church was not part of the establishment, the democratization of the country 
in the 1990s did not challenge the Church’s past stances, as was the case in Spain. Quite the 
opposite, one could characterize heightened religiosity as a rebellion or counter reaction to 
the collapse of Eastern Europe’s socialist governments. Therefore, post-communist Poland 
maintained the Church’s doctrine condemning homosexuality, and continued to hold on to 
their anti-LGBT attitudes.
Similarly, one could argue that Europeanization has had little effect on Poland in moti-
vating its politicians to adopt same-sex marriage or any other kind of same-sex union. Poland, 
like many of its Eastern European neighbors, does not have any kind of domestic partnership 
or civil union and actually defines marriage as between a mixed sex couple in the national 
constitution. It would seem that joining the EU has done little to help same-sex marriage 
in Poland; in fact, some Polish leaders criticized the proposed European Constitution on the 
grounds that it could force same-sex marriage upon them. However, we should also remem-
ber that as a member of the EU, Poland was required to ban discrimination against LGBT 
people in the workplace, housing, and government. More recently, the European Court of 
Human Rights ruled that LGBT people have the right to inherit from their partners. While 
in reality few of these protections are honored, it is still clear that the necessity to become a 
part of Europe has forced Poland to make some concessions to LGBT rights.
I would also argue that it is too soon to judge Poland and its stance on LGBT rights. 
Spaniards had to wait almost 30 years between Franco’s death and the country’s adoption of 
same-sex marriage. If we put Poland on a similar timeframe, we shouldn’t expect the same 
amount of progress on this issue, as they have experienced only 20 years of democratiza-
tion. Of course Poland is not the only example of a strongly religious country that remains 
strongly anti-gay despite years of oppression under an authoritarian system. However, by the 
same token Spain is not the only Catholic country in Europe to have embraced same-sex 
marriage following a fascist dictatorship.
Portugal’s acceptance of same-sex marriage
Portugal, like Spain, experienced an authoritarian post-World War II dictatorship dur-
ing the period of the Estado Novo, or “New State,” founded by António de Oliveira Salazar 
in the 1930s. While the fascist Francisco Franco held power in Spain for almost four whole 
decades, Salazar and his successor presided over their authoritarian regime in Portugal for 
nearly 50 years, winning the claim to the longest European dictatorship of the 20th century 
(Andresen, 2007). Salazar began his political career as the finance minister in Portuguese gov-
ernment of the 1920s.  He used his power to become de facto prime minister in 1932, at the 
same time maintaining his past position over finances. Throughout his forty year reign over 
Portugal, Salazar held several other offices and ran the country as a dictator. While Portugal 
was technically governed by a constitution, championed by Salazar himself in the 1930s, 
the document’s regulations were routinely ignored. For example, elections in Portugal were 
never free and often fraudulent; ballot rigging began even in the 1933 plebiscite to adopt the 
constitution. Opposing political leaders were jailed, tortured, and sometimes killed, enforcing 
the uncontested rule of Salazar’s National Union party (Andresen, 2007).  
While Salazar was not technically a fascist like Franco, his political philosophies and 
practices were very similar to his period’s counterparts in Spain, Germany, and Italy. The 
government was undemocratic and Salazar’s idealism was strongly right-wing, authoritarian, 
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traditional, and conservative. Free speech, government criticism, and democratic movements 
were suppressed, often through the use of the state’s secret police. Additionally, Catholicism 
was a strong force in the society of the Estado Novo. The Roman Catholic Church was the 
state religion of Portugal and Church teachings governed the religious and moral lives of 
Portuguese citizens, just as in Spain (Andresen, 2007). With moral authority relying on the 
conservative teachings of the Catholic Church, homosexuality was also repressed under 
Salazar’s reign. Similarly to Spain, homosexuality was a crime punishable as “vagrancy” under 
the right-wing period of control. LGBT people were forced to hide their identities from 
the public because of their illegal statuses. Combined with Salazar’s constant oppression of 
political and social dissidents, there was no chance for an LGBT rights organization to form 
before the end of the Estado Novo. In fact, the LGBT rights movement in Portugal did not 
begin to appear until the 1990s, much later than in Spain (Carneiro & Menezes, 2007).  
Unlike in Spain, Salazar’s death did not immediately bring reform to the political 
system. Even though he was followed by another dictator, Portugal would begin democ-
ratizing during the Carnation Revolution in 1974, six years after Salazar’s death (Carneiro 
& Menezes, 2007). Out of this history, a newfound environment for political freedom and 
expression emerged and Portugal saw a great transformation from a right-wing, authoritar-
ian dictatorship, to a liberal democracy. However, LGBT rights organizations were slower 
to form in this environment than in neighboring Spain. Perhaps there was not as great of 
a backlash against the oppressiveness of Salazar’s regime because it had not been blatantly 
fascist. Maybe the Portuguese would have been quicker to confront their legacy of oppres-
sion had they felt the need to compensate for a fascist past, as was the case in Spain. In any 
case, LGBT organizations did not begin to form and gain prominence in Portugal until the 
mid-1990s, a time when Spanish LGBT rights organizations were already scoring numerous 
victories by securing same-sex unions at the sub national level (Carneiro & Menezes, 2007). 
As was the case in Spain, Portuguese politicians were driven to expand LGBT rights 
because of the EU’s progressively broader standards regarding human and family rights. Eu-
ropeanization would drive Portugal to implement increasingly tolerant measures to pro-
tect its LGBT population from discrimination and provide them with rights in same-sex 
unions. Striving to meet international human rights standards was likely a goal when the law 
criminalizing homosexual acts was repealed in 1982, several years before any LGBT rights 
organizations in Portugal had formed. Even without an internal movement, there was still 
pressure on Portugal to modernize to European standards when it came to the criminaliza-
tion of homosexuality.  
Furthermore, the European standards were likely motivators encouraging Portuguese 
politicians to adopt even greater protections for their LGBT citizens. While employment, 
housing, and other discrimination protections were the norm in the late 1990s EU, inter-
national standards encourage Portuguese lawmakers to tackle the issue of same-sex unions. 
In 2001, Portuguese LGBT rights advocates won a victory in securing a domestic partner-
ship status for same-sex couples. Nine years later, the struggle would go a step further with 
the legalization of gender-neutral marriage, making Portugal one of the most progressive 
countries in the world concerning LGBT rights. Portugal is groundbreaking in the realm of 
LGBT rights for more reasons than just having legalized same-sex marriage. In 2004, Portu-
gal’s Parliament adopted an amendment to the country’s constitution defining “sexual ori-
entation” as a class protected from discrimination. While numerous countries in Europe and 
some in other regions have legal protections for LGBT, very few have gone so far as to ad-
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vance constitutional amendments enshrining those protections (Carneiro & Menezes, 2007).
Today’s Portugal is one of the most outspoken countries in favor of LGBT rights, a 
far cry from the blatantly homophobic Estado Novo. At the same time, Portugal remains 
a very deeply religious society, with 81 percent of the population demonstrating a belief 
in god and the vast majority of members belonging to the socially conservative Catholic 
Church. While the Vatican is certainly opposed to the progress made by Portugal towards 
gender-neutral marriage and recognizing LGBT people as a protected class of citizens, the 
country’s politicians have found compelling evidence from other sources negating Church 
teaching and advancing the cause for same-sex unions. This acts as evidence that support for 
both religion and LGBT rights are not mutually exclusive. Even in cultures that are strongly 
religious and Catholic, support for LGBT rights is possible when the discussion is framed as 
a human rights issue.
Even though Spain and Portugal are very similar cases, sharing common themes re-
garding historical oppression and current LGBT acceptance, there are also some important 
differences between the two countries’ experiences that are relevant to this topic. I would 
argue that the more severe governing of Spain led to a stronger counter reaction in favor of 
LGBT rights in that country. While both Spain and Portugal were governed by oppressive, 
authoritarian dictatorships, the system under Franco was by most accounts much more ex-
treme and oppressive. Again, this could also explain why support for same-sex marriage is 27 
percent higher among Spaniards than it is among Portuguese. The severity of Franco’s dic-
tatorship also likely contributed to the population’s loss of respect for the Catholic Church 
as an authority for human rights, morality, and religion in general. Religiosity is 22 percent 
higher in Portugal than it is in Spain; perhaps more Spaniards became disillusioned with the 
Church after witnessing it uphold and benefit from the oppressiveness of the fascist dictator-
ship. Portuguese, having endured a less rigid experience, could be more optimistic with the 
Church and more likely to look to Catholicism as a moral authority.
Conclusions
Despite their differences, the commonalities between Spain and Portugal, when exam-
ining both their past history and current LGBT rights standards, are overwhelmingly strong. 
Ultimately, the two similar experiences contributed to those countries’ understanding of 
LGBT rights as a human rights issue. This framing has met overwhelming success in both 
nations, superseding the moral arguments of the Church, even though Catholicism remains 
relatively popular in the lives of Spanish and Portuguese citizens. The reasons Spain and 
Portugal have same-sex marriage today are not because the population is against religion or 
openly defiant of the Catholic Church, but because LGBT rights organizations were able 
to effectively frame their causes from a human rights perspective. Following the collapse of 
the authoritarian dictatorships in the 1970s, democratization ushered in a new era of reform 
that sparked LGBT rights movements in Spain and eventually Portugal. Meanwhile, gender 
roles were challenged and ultimately redefined, leading the way for greater acceptance of 
sexual minorities. Spaniards and Portuguese, remembering the rampant human rights abuses 
committed under their Franco and Salazar, could empathize with the marginalized LGBT 
populations and recognized the universal sanctity of human rights. Encouraged by the stan-
dards of the European community, Spain and Portugal continued to compensate for their 
undemocratic pasts by striving to enforce the newly prized value of equality for all citizens. 
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Possible examples outside Europe
In some cases, like Portugal and Spain, examining the historical experiences of an in-
dividual country can give us a very good sense of why that society would support same-sex 
unions and LGBT rights. Of course, there are other countries that have not been mentioned 
where this analysis could be just as applicable. Another recent example could be in Argen-
tina, the latest country in the world to adopt gender-neutral marriage. Argentina is actually 
a similar example to Spain and Portugal in that all three are Catholic countries, have Latin 
cultures, and endured right-wing dictatorships during the 20th Century. Argentina suffered 
extensively under a military dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s, when thousands of Ar-
gentines were tortured, killed, and their bodies disappeared in what became known as the 
Dirty War. LGBT rights organizations that were present before the coup were disbanded by 
the military dictatorship as part of the regimes efforts to censure the public. Having had an 
oppressive regime that scarred Argentina’s identity, protections for LGBT people and the 
adoption of same-sex unions could be a logical response to the past atrocities. However, 
same-sex marriage is a very recent development in Argentina and the motivations behind 
the government’s adoption of this policy has not been sufficiently researched.
Another case could be made for South Africa, a country with a very long, infamous, 
and extreme history of brutal oppression in the form of apartheid. For most of the 20th 
Century, South Africa was dominated by a white minority who ruled over the black major-
ity with a system of racial segregation known as apartheid. Whites were overwhelmingly fa-
vored in the system, while non-whites suffered enormous economic disparities and political 
oppression. The apartheid system finally fell in 1994 due to a combination of international 
pressure and internal activism, giving way to popular elections and enfranchisement of the 
impoverished and subjugated black majority. Today, black South Africans still suffer from the 
legacy of apartheid, but the political system has made progress towards equality in that blacks 
are no longer excluded from the political process. South Africa is very different than Spain, 
Portugal, and Argentina in its culture, geographical location, and demographics, but yet the 
four countries do share a history of oppressive regimes.
Moreover, South Africa’s relation with LGBT rights is a direct reaction to its past his-
tory of oppression, authoritarianism, and inequality experienced under apartheid. In the 
post-apartheid constitution adopted in 1996, discrimination based on sexual orientation was 
explicitly banned, making South Africa the first country in the world to do so. Inequality 
under the law would not be tolerated in this new society that had suffered so long from an 
unfair and discriminatory system. Nine years later, the highest court in South Africa would 
rule that the legislature had to allow same-sex couples to form legal unions with the same 
rights and responsibilities opposite-sex couples enjoyed in marriage. In response, the South 
African government legalized gender-neutral marriage, becoming the first country in the 
developing world to allow same-sex marriage. Without South Africa’s very specific and harsh 
experience with discrimination, inequality, and oppression during the apartheid regime, it 
is unlikely that the country would have been motivated to go so far in protecting the rights 
of LGBT people. While these observations are interesting, especially in light of the authori-
tarian experiences in Spain and Portugal, more research is needed before we can make any 
definitive conclusions.
Repercussions for other LGBT rights movements
These observations also have widespread implications for LGBT rights groups around 
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the world, even in countries without discrimination protections or relationship recognition. 
Perhaps they should look to success stories for guidance and strategies. LGBT rights and 
same-sex union advocates in countries like Spain and Portugal have had the most success 
when they position their causes as extensions of human rights and equality. This argument 
can be especially potent in a country like Spain, where human rights were trampled upon for 
the greater part of the 20th century under the rule of the fascist and authoritarian dictator 
Francisco Franco. The EU requires discrimination protections for LGBT people and other 
minority groups because of the historical oppression of these groups and the disaster of 
World War II and the Holocaust, which was caused largely by the erosion and ignorance of 
basic human rights. Discussions about human and LGBT rights are often framed in a nation’s 
own perspective based on its historical experiences.  
Indeed, in the United States the recent wave of the LGBT rights movement is often 
termed as an extension of the Civil Rights Movement begun by Martin Luther King Jr. and 
others like him in the 1960s, just as LBGT rights in Spain are viewed as a reaction against the 
oppressiveness of Franco. This is an interesting comparison considering that African Ameri-
cans, the group that most obviously benefitted from the Civil Rights Movement and the 
accompanying legislation, are one of the most hostile demographics to LGBT rights causes, 
including same-sex marriage, in the United States. Indeed, some commentators on Proposi-
tion 8 in California unfairly blamed the measure’s passage on African American voters, who 
supported the initiative overwhelmingly according to exit polls. Much of this hostility is also 
attributed to religion, as African Americans are often polled to be more religious than other 
demographics. However, if we are to learn anything from the very religious, yet LGBT-
friendly societies in Spain and Portugal, it is that religiosity and support for LGBT rights are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive. In addition, one of the great failures of the LGBT rights 
movement in the United States has been its exclusion of ethnic and racial minorities. This is 
sadly ironic, because of all the groups that should empathize together and be champions of 
each other’s rights, it should be those that have been and continue to be the most thoroughly 
oppressed by the political system. Indeed, civil rights groups such as the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People have come out in favor of gay rights, straining some 
of these stereotypes. I would argue that there is very real potential for the African American 
community to reverse its stereotypical stance on LGBT rights issues, but only if LGBT rights 
organizations will knock down their own racist barriers and relate their causes on a level that 
speaks to a universal understanding of human dignity. Of course, this tactic is not only rel-
evant to reaching oppressed ethnic and racial minorities in the United States, but also wider 
populations of religious people.
Although these observations of racism are by no means novel or unique in today’s 
debate, criticisms of LGBT rights groups for being anti-religious seem much less common. 
Following the passage of California’s Proposition 8 in 2008, there was a spate of vandalisms 
against Catholic, Evangelical, and Mormon churches and temples as a reaction against those 
religions’ monetary and explicit support of the initiative. While none of these activities were 
condoned by prominent LGBT rights organizations like the Human Rights Campaign or 
the Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (many were actually condemned), the mere 
occurrence of these incidents hurt the LGBT rights cause because it alienated religious 
people. In societies where religion has a very strong presence, including Spain, Portugal, and 
the United States, LGBT rights organizations cannot be dismissive of religion or position 
themselves as being antithetical to bodies like the Catholic Church. Instead, religious de-
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nominations and people must be approached and convinced of the merits behind the LGBT 
rights cause. In fact, recent polls suggest that overwhelming majorities of American Catholics 
are in favor of specific LGBT rights including relationship recognition, directly contradicting 
the Vatican’s official stance on the issues (Jones & Cox, 2011). Perhaps this is evidence that 
an inclusive stance towards religion has tremendous potential for success, allowing same-sex 
unions to be advanced as an extension of equality, basic human rights, and civil rights. The 
struggle facing LGBT activists in the United States is to successfully change the terms of 
the discussion from a debate over morality to one that mirrors Spain and Portugal: a matter 
of equality.
References
Andresen, N. (2007). The Salazar regime and European integration, 1947-1972. European 
Review of History, 14(2), 195-214.
Carneiro, N., & Menezes, I. (2007). From an oppressed citizenship to affirmative identities: 
lesbian and gay political participation in Portugal. Journal of Homosexuality, 53(3), 65-82.
European Commission. (2005). Special Eurobarometer 255: social values, science and technology. 
Retrieved October 3, 2010, from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/ archives/ebs/
ebs 225_report_en.pdf
European Commission. (2007). Eurobarometer 66: public opinion in the European Union. Re-
trieved October 3, 2010, from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/ 
eb66_en.pdf 
Fabrizio, A. (2007). Italy: politics under the Vatican’s glare. Gay & Lesbian Review Worldwide, 
14(7), 18.
Jones, R., & Cox, D. (2011). Public Religion Research Institute. Catholic attitudes on gay and les-
bian issues: a comprehensive portrait from recent research. Retrieved March 23, 2011, from 
http://www.publicreligion.org/objects/uploads/40/Catholics_and_LGBT_ issues 
_2010_FINAL.pdf
Martinez, O., & Dodge, B. (2010). El barrio de la Chueca of Madrid, Spain: An emerging 
epicenter of the global LGBT civil rights movement. Journal of Homosexuality, 57(2), 
226-248.
Méndez, R. (2007). Intersection gender and sexual orientation: an analysis of sexuality and 
citizenship in gender equality policies in Spain. Critical Review of International Social and 
Political Philosophy, 10(4), 575-97.
Merin, Yuval. (2002). Equality for same-sex couples. Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press.
Moscati, M. (2010). Trajectory of reform: Catholicism, the state and the civil society in the 
developments of LGBT rights. Liverpool Law Review, 31(1), 51-68.
Petrou, M. (2006). Spain’s split personality. Maclean’s, 119(40), 43-4.
Platero, R. (2007). Love and the state: gay marriage in Spain. Feminist Legal Studies, 15(3), 
329-40.
Ratzinger, J. (2003). Considerations regarding proposals to give legal recognition to unions 
between homosexual persons. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Rome, Italy: 
The Vatican. Retrieved December 10, 2010, from http://www.vatican.va/roman_cu-
ria/ congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20030731_homosexual-
unions_en.html 
Noah Jennings University of San Francisco52
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2011/iss1/6
